Book Critique: The Invisible Hook

The following critique is from a first draft of our literature review. It is deliberately analytical, rather than normative, in keeping with the orientation of our own research project. This is why, instead of objecting to Leeson's characterization of torture as rational on normative grounds, I have pointed out the empirical contradictions in his analysis of torture and looked at his arguments as a means to undermine the explanatory power of rational choice theory on this subject. This is not to suggest that I in any way agree with the normative implications of Leeson's hagiographic treatment of pirates, but merely that for the purposes of our project, it made sense to confine my critical reading to the analytic realm.
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In his 2009 book The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates, economist Peter T. Leeson argues that rational choice theory is the only way to understand “flamboyant, bizarre, and downright shocking pirate practices” of the 18th century (6). Leeson’s thesis is that ostensibly modern societal ideas such as the democratic process, power-sharing, and racial equality emerged not as liberal ideological ends, but as rationally efficient means by which pirates could operate as a successful criminal social group. Leeson offers an economic basis for accounts of piratical democracies, codes of conduct, and racial tolerance; presents flying the Jolly Roger and torturing captives as rationally-motivated examples of economic signaling; and argues that conscription was the inefficient exception, not the rule, aboard pirate ships. However, because Leeson begins with the assumption that pirates were rational actors (5), his subsequent empirical proof of how pirates’ actions were rational is unnecessary, rendering his analysis an unimpressive contribution to understanding the pirate tradition¹. Indeed, The Invisible Hook is better viewed as a particular configuration of commonplaces than as a conceptual history of piracy (Hansen 2006: 81). There are three main problems with Leeson’s work as a piece of analytical literature: flawed reasoning; empirical errors; internal inconsistencies.

Leeson’s account is unique among modern sources on historical piracy in its acknowledgment of the important role perception plays in the pirate tradition. He argues that pirates deliberately crafted a terrifying image of themselves in order to more efficiently elicit information from hostages, punish government officials, and regulate conduct on board the ship. “Pirates skillfully deployed their infamous instruments of terror, generating a reputation for cruelty and madness that spread throughout the maritime world” (108). Similarly, by flying the Jolly Roger, pirate ships signaled their identity to merchant ships in order to minimize resistance (90), and to capitalize on the fact that merchants were less likely to resist pirates than state-sanctioned attackers (99). Leeson’s research suggests that pirates quite deliberately linked their marginal identity to a discourse of barbarism and excessive violence. Although this argument reveals a particularly interesting rhetorical positioning of piratical identity, as an analytical justification for pirates’ rationality, it is fundamentally tautological. If we begin with the assumption that pirates are rational actors, then of course pirates’ actions can – indeed, must – be read as rational, but this is little more than an elaborate definition of the original assumption, akin to Leeson’s statement that “Pirates’ system of private governance was highly successful, a fact reflected in the success of piracy itself” (79). In addition to being a tautology, the conclusion of this statement is not entirely true. By the late 1700s, piracy would be virtually eliminated as large-scale threat for close to 300 years. The Invisible Hook only explains a discrete moment in the pirate tradition; it does not consider how interpretations of the threat of piracy changed over time nor does it explain how piracy ceased to be regarded as a credible threat at all.

Leeson’s empirical evidence for his claims about pirates’ rational actions is flawed or incomplete in several places. Many of his arguments about piratical democratic institutions and systems of governance are based on so-called pirate codes (58). While there is indeed evidence that pirates drew up such agreements, there is much less to suggest these codes were reliably enforced. There are three reasons to regard the presumed adherence to these codes with skepticism. First, Leeson presents Charles Johnson’s account² of such articles aboard Captain Robert’s ship as evidence for pirates’ private governance (62). Aside from the obvious point that existence of an ostensibly liberal democratic constitution does not in any way guarantee liberal democratic rule, there is textual evidence in the Johnson account itself which suggests that the articles enumerated therein were incomplete and probably whitewashed:

These, we are assured, were some of Roberts's Articles, but as they had taken Care to throw over-board the Original they had sign'd and sworn to, there is a great deal of Room to suspect, the remainder contained something too horrid to be disclosed to any, except such as were willing to be Sharers in the Iniquity of them ... (Defoe 1724: 233)

Second, Leeson also offers Alexander Exquemelin’s description of 17th century buccaneers’ articles of agreement as further evidence of the triumph of piratical private governance. However, if Johnson expressed doubts about the content of the articles aboard Roberts’ ship, the anonymous author of the preface to the 1699 edition of Exquemelin’s Buccaneers of America specifically calls into question the enforcement of the articles designed to prevent negative externalities:

However it is very remarkable, that in such a lawless Body as these Bucaniers seemed to be, in respect to all others; that yet there should be such an Oeconomy (if I may so say) kept and regularity practiced among themselves, so that every one seemed to have his property as much secured, as if he had been a member of the most Civilized Community in the World; tho at the same time when I consider of some of their Laws, such as those against Drunkenness and the like immoralities, I believe I have a great deal of reason to remain suspicious of their Sincerity. (Esquemeling 1699: 5. Emphasis added)

Although neither of these quotations specifically says that pirates’ compliance with their articles of confederation was less than exemplary, they do indicate that even pirates’ contemporaries had reason to doubt the adherence to liberal democratic norms aboard pirate ships. Leeson’s uncritical acceptance of piratical obedience indicates a lack of analytical rigor for the sake of theoretical coherence, since rational choice theory only tells us something about pirate laws if these laws were actually obeyed.

Finally, because Leeson walks a fine line in his analysis (pirates were only just violent enough to craft a public identity for themselves as violent), he ends up undermining his initial claim that adherence to pirate codes was purely voluntary. Leeson contends that private governance is superior to state governments, and he alleges that the primary difference between the two is that governance is voluntary while government is characterized by coercive force (47-50). It is therefore essential that he prove that pirate codes were consented to voluntarily, an argument he makes in his application of Tiebout model to competition among pirate crews (61). Actually, because Tiebout competition describes how governments (not forms of governance) compete for citizens, this concept directly refutes Leeson’s earlier assertion that “If you don’t like the rules government sets up, it’s too bad. You don’t have the choice of saying … ‘no thank you, I don’t much care for your rules, so I’m going to take my money and live according to my own rules’” (50). Tiebout competition assumes citizens can, to use Leeson’s formulation, say, “I don’t much care for your rules, so I’m going to take my money and live according to some other rules.”³

Leeson’s initial assertion is not only a questionable application of social contract theory⁴ and theoretically inconsistent with his use of Tiebout competition, but most importantly it is empirically refuted in his chapter on impressments. Leeson begins this chapter by asserting that conscription and forced adherence to pirate law was seen as inefficient and therefore rare aboard pirate ships (136). However, the empirical accounts he uses to support this assertion suggest that coercive force played a significant role even in “voluntary” adherence to pirate codes:

When Edward Low captured Philip Ashton, for instance, he began with the pirates’ traditional inquiry of the captured crew about who would join them. As Ashton put it, “according to the Pirates usual custom ... [he] asked me, If I would sign their Articles and go along with them.” A man of strong moral fiber, Ashton declined. When this failed Low returned to him later and “asked the Old Question, Whether we would Sign their Articles, and go along with them?” When Ashton refused again, Low waited and then reapproached Ashton, this time demanding “with Sterness and Threats, whether I would Joyn with them?” On his third refusal the pirates “assaulted” Ashton -- but not with fists. Rather, they subjected the upright sailor to “temptations of another kind, in hopes to win me over... [they] treated me with an abundance of Respect and Kindness,” offering Ashton a drink and doing all they could to “sooth my Sorrows.” Only when Ashton rebuffed the fourth advance did a frustrated Low resort to violent intimidation, declaring, “If you will not sign our Articles, and go along with me, I'll shoot you thro' the Head.” Much to Low's consternation, Ashton remained obstinate, and the pirate captain dragged Ashton with him anyway. (137-138)

Though Leeson inexplicably reads the repeated attempts to convince Ashton to sign the articles as evidence of the high value pirates placed on volunteers, there can be no clearer articulation of coercive force than, “If you will not sign our Articles, I’ll shoot you through the head.” The bizarreness of this interpretation is underscored by Leeson’s earlier statement that, “Voluntary choice requires that our options aren’t framed under the threat of force” (50).

Leeson goes on to say that “Some prisoners ‘converted’ because pirate crews denied conscripts the rights afforded to volunteers, such as participation in the ship's democratic decision making, the right to their shares of plunder, and the right to settle disputes with other crew members by duel” (141). However, the denial of rights to those who will not adhere to the laws is yet another example of the sort of coercive force Leeson so strongly objects to in governments (50-51). Despite his professed preference for private governance, Leeson does seem to tacitly admit the necessity of government in some cases. In his chapter in the rational applications of torture, Leeson writes that “In terms of the costs and benefits they faced of bringing justice⁵ to abusive merchant ship captains on the high seas, pirates were better suited to this task than government” (127). However, he later notes that “absent any controls, pirate justice could be unfair, excessive, and in more than a few cases was probably totally unwarranted” (132). This is essentially Hobbes’ argument for why coercive government is necessary.

In addition to being empirically weak and internally inconsistent, Leeson’s book ends up telling us little more than the following: If we assume pirates were rational actors, then we can construct rational explanations for their actions. Leeson has attempted to do this, resulting in an analytically empty tautology that says that rationally self-interested cooperation can lead to ostensibly democratic social groups, excessively brutal torture, racial equality, participation in the slave trade, and colorful flags.

¹Furthermore, Leeson concedes that rational choice theory fails to account for all piratical actions, noting that “although pirates overwhelmingly tortured ‘with purpose,’ there are cases that were no more than sadism as well” (132). The distinction between “rational” torture and “sadistic” torture is left wholly unclear.

²Some editions of A General History of the Pyrates have been inaccurately attributed to Daniel Defoe. Although present-day research indicates that Defoe was not in fact the author, our citations reflect the author listed on the edition being cited.

³Or more formally, “In a Tiebout model, local jurisdictions compete for citizens by offering bundles of public goods. Citizens then sort themselves among jurisdictions according to their preferences.” (Ken Kollman, John H. Miller and Scott E. Page. “Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model.” The American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 5. Dec. 1997: 977)

⁴For example, Rousseau argues that sovereign authorities only gain their authority from the general will and that when the people are displeased by a law, they can dissolve and reconstitute the existing sovereign and its laws. The distanced formulation “I don’t much care for your rules” is meaningless in such a government. Indeed, most social contract theorists articulate answers to the question of individual disagreement with societal laws. For instance, one can construct a defensible reading of Locke’s Second Treatise on Government that says it is entirely possible and acceptable for people to remain outside a government they have no interest in joining. “This [forming a civil society] any number of Men may do, because it injures not the Freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the Liberty of the State of Nature” (John Locke. Two Treatises of Government. Ed. Peter Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989: 331). However, a further extension of this kind of critique is rendered largely unnecessary by the internal contradictions in Leeson’s work.

⁵Leeson is apparently condoning torture as an acceptable form of justice. Although my present critique is deliberately analytical, not normative in orientation, it is worth noting how Leeson’s application of rational choice theory positions piracy as outside the realm of ethical judgment.