A word of clarification, then a line-by-line (without wading into your epic debate with PTJ which, while I wish I could have witnessed it, is somewhat separate from the point I was trying to highlight in posting this article): As someone whose only firm commitments at this point are to humanism, the explicitly non-theist (though not non-religious) principles of Unitarian Universalism, and the brilliance of Carl Sagan’s Cosmos, I have very little interest in defending religion as a way of knowing about the great cosmic mysteries and am not about to do so. “Militant atheist” wasn’t my wording and wouldn’t have been. I am, however, utterly uninterested in Dawkins’ brand of evangelical atheism. I agree with Sheiman (and I suppose with Prof. Jackson) that continuing to cast religion and science as antagonists is not only a poor representation of reality but is counterproductive to the promise that both institutions hold for human progress. At some level, when you assert that there is something inherently violent and destructive about religion, you commit yourself to opposing it through means that can well become militant. Telling people they’re stupid for believing in God certainly isn’t physical violence, but to the extent that religion *is* an identity for many people, this kind of approach is a form of (admittedly posty-toasty) violence (to their subjectivity). By no means should religious belief be treated as some sort of sacred cow (oof, sorry) exempt from criticism, but nor is “religious faith is stupid, immature, and harmful” a legitimate starting point for debate.As for Dawkins, he is indeed a brilliant old British biologist. He is also someone who has chosen to devote a significant portion of his life to converting the world to his version of atheism through a variety of disrespectful (and therefore fairly hypocritical, not to mention ineffective) means. He stays in my post. Anyway, he wants to be there, adorable grin and all.On, as you say, to Sheiman’s arguments and your responses. I’m not particularly invested in defending the totality of his article (just his main thesis about partnership), but such an exercise seems like more fun than writing 1200 words on Marx’s and Smith’s theory of value, so here we go. You’re halfway right that religion doesn’t define human norms or behavior; it certainly doesn’t do so in any deterministic way, but it absolutely *influences* norms. Do you really think that norms of US foreign policy are not influenced by our historically Christian identity and idea that we’re somehow God’s chosen people? (Please understand that this is in no way a normative endorsement of said identity; merely an observation that it exists.) At that same time, as you point out, norms of behavior shape religious belief. There are a lot of very good contextual reasons for my religious identity based solely on the fact that I grew up in a liberal academic 20th century American household. That’s historical contingency and mutually constitutive causality for you (in case you’d been yearning for some social constructivism of late). More broadly, my point here is that religion’s influence on social norms is in no way lessened by its not being handed down on stone tablets: it has real influence because people believe it does and act accordingly. Why does this matter? First, because it points to the pragmatic absurdity of trying to eradicate religious belief: It’s not just a product of society but also a cause of it. And second, because recognizing that religion is not simply a mechanical effect of time and place means acknowledging that there’s nothing inherent in the institution of religion that stops people from thinking. Some religions do seek to do just that; many others do not. Blanket attacks on religion as coercive and unthinking, however, represent a fundamental misunderstanding premised on generalizations built on a few (admittedly really loud) manifestations of the phenomenon of religious belief. Take a moment to listen to the quiet faiths – the Quakers, the Buddhists, the Unitarians, among others for – that do indeed encourage free thinking.Ok, on to science. Your claim is that science and religion are incommensurable approaches to our knowledge of the universe, to which I have two responses. First, claiming that, “Faith is not a way of knowing about the universe because it’s not based on empirical science” is a classic example of begging the question. Your assumption that empiricism is the best or only means of knowing things predetermines the outcome of any debate just as much as the theist’s claim that, “Faith means I don’t need empirical evidence for anything I claim to know” does. I happen to find empiricism pretty damn attractive, but that’s not to say there are not all sorts of philosophical problems with knowledge claims and justified true belief that cannot be answered with a simple appeal to empiricism (Gettier problems and all that). And, much of contemporary philosophy of science further complicates the situation by observing that while Popperian falsifiability is a tidy improvement on verification, scientific theories aren’t actually (empirically …) thrown out on the basis of contravening evidence. Hence Kuhn’s paradigms and Lakatos’ research programs, which are defined by a core set of assumptions, propositions, and beliefs that are, by definition, empirically irrefutable. Empiricism does not unambiguously mean knowledge, and science does not unambiguously mean empiricism: my point here is that championing “science” as the apex of epistemic perfection is every bit as dishonest and misleading as Sheiman’s strawmanning of militant atheists.My second response to this incommensurability claim – and the one I’m most comfortable with – is the one you essentially cede later on: that science and religion are asking different questions and are seeking different kinds of knowledge. Yeah, some religions have a bad habit of stepping on science’s turf, but again, there’s nothing inherent in religion that says this has to be the case. Criticize specific instances of this epistemic infringement if you like, but don’t target the institution of religion.I’m not sure where your claim that religion doesn’t tell us how to act or what is good or evil comes from: It absolutely does. Most of the Christian Bible can be divided into one of those functions or the other. Religion is by no means a necessary condition for morality but it certainly functions as a sufficient one. And so too does science – and it’s in this appropriation of traditionally religious turf that religion feels threatened. Unfettered scientific enquiry is and must be its own imperative: Keep asking questions ad infinitum. And it creates its own narratives (albeit very narrow ones) of “how we should act”: We should seek out scientific and technological solutions to human problems because we can. By creating narratives of humanity as its own salvation, scientific inquiry does indeed offer up a version of what is “good.” Secular, sure, but no less ethical because of its empirical basis. And for progressives like Sheiman, this “infringement” is a space of possibility. Science’s version of what’s good and religion’s version of what’s good can and in many cases do overlap. To the extent that both can buttress improvement in the human condition, there’s ample room for dialogue and good cause for abandoning the dichotomous characterization Dawkins – and plenty of evangelical Christians – are so eager to preserve.As for religion being an early phase of intellectual development in individuals, again, this presupposes that empiricism is a “better” way of understanding the world than religious belief. That religion chronologically precedes empiricism in an individual’s epistemic commitments is an empirical claim; that empiricism is a better way of understanding the world is a normative question and not subject to the rigors of empirical verification. In any case, I think the pragmatic argument carries the day here: Even if it’s a developmentally prior form of understanding, religious belief is a subjectively legitimate path to knowledge for those who hold it and as such, it’s going to influence their patterns of action in a way that will leave them unpersuaded by allegations of their intellectual immaturity. Hardly a good means of converting the faithful to skepticism. Which, as you point out, Tyson pretty much gets. Other than that, I’m not sure how this immaturity argument interacts with the claim that science and religion can team up to do good things in the demon-haunted world.Your next point, however, is pretty hypocritical. You criticize Sheiman for a narrow definition of “nature” then go on to define religion as “Don’t worry about it. You’ll meet magical people when you die.” I understand that was probably for rhetorical effect, but as we’ve both pointed out, tone and characterization matter in these kind of debates and that’s hardly an understanding of religion that’s going to get you very far in convincing the faithful of the merits of scientific empiricism. First, not all religions include, nor are most religions defined as, metaphysical conceptions of an afterlife. The religious enterprise concerning our aversion to death that Sheiman is speaking to is not one of a celestial afterlife in the clouds but one that argues for creating the kingdom of heaven on earth: for doing what we can so that our neighbors don’t die unnecessarily. Science too, insofar as it does not happen in a social or ethical vacuum, compels us to do the same – and gives us the technological means to do it. Why breed wheat with a greater yield? Why work harder to get the jump on quickly mutating viruses? Why develop better genetic tests for life-threatening diseases? Because in doing so we can push the limits of our understanding of the world. Because it improves people’s lives. Because Christ tells us to take care of the poor and the sick. These reasons aren’t incompatible at all and the potential they create for the alleviation of human suffering and the furthering of human knowledge is something that should be acknowledged and celebrated. And while it’s hardly likely to solve the epidemic of pseudoscience or get intelligent design OUT of our science classrooms, it just might facilitate the discursive climate and common ground that I imagine would be a prerequisite to these kinds of moves.
Chris:
Better off continuing Dr. Tyson-penned works. http://www.haydenplanetarium.org/tyson/read/essays/nathist/perimeterofignorance
Erin:
I agree that God isn't necessary to fill in the gaps of human knowledge. (But I kind of suspect that's not how many contemporary theists conceive of the divine in any case.) And as I said earlier, you don't need to convince me that science is a better way of understanding the universe. (But this is a more complex claim to make that "science wins because it's empirical and predictive!" I mean, evolutionary biology's not explicitly predictive, and I'm still down with that. Within Newtonian physics, universal gravitation isn't subject to falsification and that's probably ok too.) And yeah, it is bad news when religion tells us to stop asking questions. But Sheiman's contention -- and mine -- is that this doesn't have to be the case: religion can encourage us to keep asking questions too (Einstein's holy curiosity). And it doesn't refute the idea that science and religion can generate overlapping ethics of human progress and that this is fundamentally a good thing.
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