THE BUCCANEERS OF AMERICA(N UNIVERSITY)
Comprising a Pertinent and Truthful description of the principal Acts of Research and Writing on the subject of representations of Pyrates

Thursday, January 28, 2010

VII. What is language?

Erin:
If you do come up with such an equation, let me know and I'll construct a multi-colored graphical representation of it :) However, I think that doing in doing so, I would miss the point just as much as J. Evans Pritchard, PhD does (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wOENu0fK0uM). Much to the chagrin of the analytic philosophers, ordinary language, like poetry, simply doesn't map neatly onto the Cartesian coordinate system, let alone onto the elegant symbolism of first-order logic. But, as Wittgenstein points out, it still *works.* Stuff happens when we call something "religious," even if its meaning is contested and vague. (Or perhaps more accurately, stuff happens because its meaning is contested and vague). So for things other than making the initial acquaintance of a new term or structuring the framework of a formal debate, I don't think dictionary definitions are good for much. As far as analyzing the potential for the institutions of science and religion to coexist and work together in the real world, I think it's a lot more helpful to look at how the words are thrown about, as cavalierly as they may be. Then too, I have no particular investment in labeling Sagan as religious or not, since it doesn't really affect my position one way or the other. That's your and PTJ's fight and, as we lack a universal shibboleth for all religion (as opposed to Christianity's handy little test of faith: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5RGxE2_G0I ...), I fear such a debate is going to devolve into a speculative interpretive attempt at getting inside Sagan's head which seems to be an explicitly non-empirically verifiable exercise. As you point out, Einstein used religious language to legitimate his work to a popular audience; I don't think we can judge whether or not he (or anyone else) was ACTUALLY religious from his writing -- just whether or not he used the language of religion, then, more interestingly, what might have caused him to do so and what the effects of doing so were (are ...).

Didn't mean to imply the consumption of spaghetti was mean-spirited when I said it was mocking. (Tell me, though, was there transubstantiation involved or was it a symbolic act of consubstantiation? Or merely an instantiation of that age-old tradition of communion, in the original sense of the word? )

As for people being idiots, I don't think irrational decision-making, inaccurate risk-assessment, or poor driving skills is much of a defense of this position, since irrationality and misperception of risk are pretty much universal. They're puzzling phenomena, to be sure, but they don't have much (any-) thing to do with intelligence. And I don't think "people are idiots" is a particularly compelling account of such behavior. It's got about as much explanatory power as the version of rational choice theory that assumes all people are rational decision-makers then proceeds to explain how they act rationally in any given situation. I'm not convinced that parsimony (your Occam's razor account) is all that important an epistemic value in social explanation.

With regard to ketchup, there is clearly a difference between the two products ... but both are called "ketchup." Why? How were advertisers able to convert mustard into a Veblen good while still labeling it "mustard," but the same was not true of ketchup? Why do people think, as Moskowitz suggests at the end, "ketchup is ketchup" but not "mustard is mustard"? The only way to answer these questions is to look at how the words are used within the social context of the condiment market ... A dictionary definition of "ketchup" or "mustard" is not going to answer those questions anymore than an entry for "flipped" is going to mention the French Prince of Bel-Air: http://www.qwantz.com/index.php?comic=1428

Chris:
Everything can be mapped into logical statements as long as they're precise enough. It's just a matter of finding all the lurking variables.

I used driving as a single example (not to mention the oblivious pedestrians and bikers one always sees, not to mention again the errors in planning the roads, not to mention the errors of people who don't pay for their roads to be maintained properly, not to mention the fact that the problem stems from improper training due to our low standards for drivers' tests set by idiots who decided that anyone should be able to pass them, a chain of idiocy that pervades almost everywhere). I don't really care if it's a compelling account of such behavior; it's easy to say and gets my point across exactly.

People are idiots; there's no way around that. P.T. Barnum once (probably) said, "Nobody every went broke underestimating the intelligence of the American people," and I don't think anyone's improved upon that quip yet (maybe Dr. House, early seasons).

In terms of the epistemic value of parsimony - The point of the rule of parsimony is to get rid of stuff you don't need. It is therefore invaluable in any endeavor that either wants to be understood, wants to understand things, or both.

You know my favorite thing about any postmodern accounts of language? Actually, two: one, they completely ignore Chomsky or anyone intelligence; and two, like all postmodernists, they use deliberately confusing language to hide the fact that they're bullshitting people. The last piece of postmodernism I appreciated was Pulp Fiction, and that came out in 1994. I can't be bothered to engage postmodernism because I'm reasonably certain it will give me an unnecessary heart condition. Which, to be fair, science and not religion will eventually cure.
Erin:
No, you're wrong. First of all Frege invented and the Vienna Circle made use of formal logic as an alternative to and improvement on everyday language, not a representation of it. The logicians saw language as it is spoken as an impediment to philosophical inquiry, not as constitutive of it (except perhaps as constitutive of philosophical "problems" ...). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein did see logic as the fundamental form of language, but such an interpretation is only useful for generating a theory of truth or a theory of language-- fun philosophical problems, if you're into that kind of thing, but certainly not explanatory theories of how the world works. They weren't intended to be. All of the hard core advocates and developers of formal languages I've read (/about) so far have seen their systems as heuristic devices for solving philosophical problems, not as accounts of the real world. Tarski, for instance, admits that there might well be insurmountable difficulties in applying his semantic conception of truth to ordinary language.

In any case, to map concepts like connotation and reference and "improper" or imprecise uses of language into a logical system would require so many logical operators (you'd need one for every way in which a word related to another word ...) that you'd just end up with a reproduction or translation of the language we speak today. Similarly, while accounting for all the variables that exert causal influence over how we use language might be theoretically possible, it is practically untenable. It's like Mill's argument that it is theoretically possible to predict an individual's actions if we know everything about that person and his or her context -- but that we can never, operating in the real world, know all that, so we need different methods for the social sciences.

I'm sure it was easy for you to say that "people are idiots," but I'm honestly not sure what the point of that sentiment is, besides misanthropy. You haven't defended it as an explanatory account of human behavior (as I argued before, in explaining everything, it explains nothing) -- and it certainly doesn't generate any insights, let alone predictions. Why didn't the US militarily threaten the UK during the Suez Crisis? Why did the US become involved with NATO intervention in the Balkans? "Because they were idiots"?

As for refusing to engage with anything you deem "postmodern," with all due respect, I think that's a pretty cowardly and intellectually close-minded position. I went into this at some length this summer, so I'll direct you here: http://roguishcommonwealth.blogspot.com/2009/06/dissent-dissent-on-pirate-blog.html as Thomson raises similar arguments to yours. By all means, critique the substance and merits of my arguments (as you have been) but don't slap the label "postmodern" on them and whine about confusing and obfuscatory language. I find advanced scientific language confusing and obfuscatory. Why? Mostly because a fairly sophisticated and specific vocabulary is needed to address complex subject matter, and I don't happen to be familiar with it. I know Chomsky claims he'd never be able to learn the language of postmodernism but a) I think that's laziness and b) I sincerely doubt I've used any such language in this conversation. If I have, by all means, call me out on some specific instances and we can talk about those! In any case, what I'm arguing for here is a method of understanding the social world that pays attention to the causal role the use of language plays in the social world, not a philosophical project of revealing hidden structures of violence and oppression, which is primarily what Chomsky's critique deals with.

Chris:
It's still interesting to me, as a thought experiment, to imagine the complexity of language broken down. As I mentioned, I am not prepared to actually do it. However, I do not believe in irreducible complexity; it seems to me that there should be some way to break things down. I do not mean to imply that I am rewriting the history of rewriting language. Again, it is a thought experiment.

As is, so far as I'm concerned, the idea that it is possible to predict an individual's actions. To me, that's more of an intellectual litmus test than a sincere endeavor. (I do not doubt, though, that we will eventually come up with technologies that can do exactly what we're describing. It'll just take a long time.)

"People are idiots" is shorthand.

I like the irony that I mis-typed the word "intelligent."

It is impossible to call someone a coward with "all due respect."

Like all things, postmodern writing follows a bell curve where most of the middle stuff is okay, but not particularly interesting. Those average people of all disciplines try to cloak their uselessness in confusing language. I just end up seeing more postmodern crap than other crap. I did not mean to accuse you of using such language.

On a deep level, I just can't stand postmodernism. It may be intellectually weak of me to not continue to engage postmodernism, but it will make me a small measure happier. You may treat this as intellectual weakness, primarily because it is, but I am ill-equipped to continue. Sorry.
TO BE CONCLUDED ...

No comments:

Post a Comment